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In this paper we study the link between elections, fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations. The 
set-up is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both 
technology and political re-election shocks. The later are incorporated via a two-party model 
with elections. The main theoretical prediction is that forward-looking incumbents, with 
uncertain prospects of re-election, find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal 
policies, and that this hurts capital accumulation. Our econometric estimation, using U.S. 
data, finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments 
and in turn macroeconomic outcomes. 
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Modern business cycle theory treats growth and cycles as integrated phenom-
ena that cannot be analyzed separately. It also suggests that both should
arise as the equilibrium outcomes of rational optimizing private and public
economic agents. As is well recognized, the reference model of this research
program (known as real business cycle (RBC)t h e o r y )i st h es t a n d a r dn e o -
classical growth model augmented with technology shocks1. In recent years,
there have been numerous developments that have attempted to improve the
model’s ability to reproduce both bi-variate and multi-variate correlations
between key macroeconomic time series2. Two common features of all these
extensions (known as dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)m o d -
els) are the inclusion of various demand and supply shocks, as well as the
introduction of market frictions that aﬀect the channels through which these
impulses propagate through the economy.
An important branch of the DSGE literature has introduced ﬁscal policy
into the basic setup3. A parsimonious way of achieving this is to model eco-
nomic policy as the outcome of elections between alternating political parties
(see e.g. Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000) for thor-
ough surveys). A central result of these models (known as political business
cycle (PBC) models) is that uncertainty about remaining in oﬃce pushes
incumbent politicians to follow relatively short-sighted policies and engineer
electoral business cycles, which in turn result in ineﬃcient macroeconomic
outcomes4.
The quantitative link between electoral uncertainty, endogenous changes
in ﬁscal policy and the ensuing macroeconomic impacts is still an open issue.
For instance, while there is some evidence of electoral eﬀects on ﬁscal policy
instruments, there is no evidence that this is translated into changes in the
macroeconomy (see Alesina et al. (1997) and Drazen (2000)). More impor-
1For a critical review of the basic RBC model, see e.g. King and Rebelo (1999).
2For the main extensions of the basic RBC model, see e.g. the papers in the volume
edited by Cooley (1995).
3For DSGE models with exogenous ﬁscal policy, see e.g. Christiano and Eichenbaum
(1992), Baxter and King (1993), McGrattan (1994), Gali (1994) and Baier and Glomm
(2001). For DSGE models, where ﬁscal policy is chosen by a benevolent Ramsey govern-
ment, see e.g. Lucas (1990), Chari et al. (1994), Lansing (1998) and Klein and Rios-Rull
(2003).
4On the other hand, elections (or the fear of losing them) can work as a disciplinary
device. For instance, they control the moral hazard of politicians, help voters to select
the most competent politician, or help voters to select the policy-maker whose ideology is
closer to their own. Here, following most of the related PBC literature, we abstract from
the beneﬁts of electoral uncertainty.
2tantly, there seems to be a gap between the albeit parsimonious theoretical
PBC models and their econometric counterparts. In particular, with few
notable exceptions5, existing empirical work has been only loosely guided
by the theory. Typically these studies are based on simple autoregressive
speciﬁcations in which various policy instruments and macroeconomic out-
comes are regressed on own lagged values, political dummies and measures
of socio-political instability.
In contrast, our research attempts to bridge the gap between DSGE and
PBC models, as well as the gulf between the latter and the data. Our aim
is to provide an integrated and tractable benchmark which improves our
empirical understanding of how electoral uncertainty aﬀects macroeconomic
aggregates via the ﬁscal policy transmission mechanism. We also hope to
shed some light into mounting post-war evidence in most OECD economies
suggesting growing public sectors and secular changes in the composition of
government expenditure in favor of public consumption at the expense of
public investment6. To achieve these objectives we develop, estimate and
simulate a DSGE model whose theoretical and econometric foundations can
be found in Barro (1990), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Ireland (2004).
Barro’s (op cit.) model provides a framework in which public investment
acts as the engine of growth. By adding government consumption to Barro’s
model, we have a simple setup capable of addressing policy-makers’ key
dilemma regarding whether to allocate scarce tax revenue to public consump-
tion or investment. Moreover, the addition of a PBCmodel á la Alesina and
Tabellini (op cit.) provides a straightforward way in which policy-makers’
choices are aﬀected by electoral uncertainty. Since we also allow for endoge-
nous re-election probabilities, these policy choices are further aﬀected by the
state of the economy. Finally, we follow the RBC literature and incorporate
technology shocks into our model, so that we can evaluate their importance
relative to electoral shocks in generating observed patterns of changes in
private and public spending. Given that the impacts of technology shocks
are well understood, their inclusion provides a context in which to interpret
our empirical ﬁndings regarding the transmission of, and eﬀects of, electoral
shocks.
To estimate the model, we use U.S. quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2004:2
and employ Ireland’s (op cit.) econometric methodology to obtain the max-
imum likelihood estimates of the structural parameters, the coeﬃcients of
the stochastic processes driving electoral and technology shocks, as well as
5Examples of papers, which formally estimate theory-based PBC models, include:
Alesina and Sachs (1988) for a partisan model of monetary policy for the US; and Lockwood
et al. (1996) for a public-ﬁnance model for the UK.
6See e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and the references cited therein.
3the parameters from a vector AR(1) model of the measurement errors. Ire-
land’s hybrid method, in contrast to earlier approaches (see e.g. Sargent
(1989)), has the distinct advantage of allowing the statistical model of the
”measurement errors” to account for movements and co-movements in the
data which unavoidably cannot be captured by our, or indeed any, stylized
DSGE model.
Our main prediction is that electoral uncertainty pushes governments to
follow relatively short-sighted ﬁscal policies and this is detrimental for the
macro-economy. When there is electoral uncertainty and the political parties
prefer to remain in oﬃce, they eﬀectively face a “quasi-ﬁnite” time horizon7.
More speciﬁcally, the higher the electoral uncertainty, the more the incum-
bent party discounts the future. Accordingly, electoral uncertainty pushes
rational forward-looking policymakers to opt for a larger size of the public
sector and also spend more on non-productive activities relative to productive
ones. The eﬀects of these two policies work in the same direction by hurt-
ing private capital accumulation for the sake of higher current government
consumption spending.
Our econometric results provide clear support for these propositions. By
explicitly modeling the behavioral channel through which the election process
aﬀects the macroeconomy, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of electoral
shocks on the policy instruments and the various components of output. In
particular, there is evidence that shocks that increase electoral uncertainty
lead to higher tax rates and less productive use of government spending.
Qualitatively, positive popularity and technology shocks have similar beneﬁ-
cial eﬀects on private spending (consumption and investment) and economic
growth. Quantitatively, the eﬀects on the policy instruments are dominated
by electoral shocks, while private spending and economic growth (as ex-
pected) are aﬀected more by technology than by electoral shocks. Finally
our forecast error decompositions reveal that while political shocks dominate
productivity shocks in the short-run, in the long-run, economic growth is
what matters most for staying in oﬃce.
2T h e o r e t i c a l m o d e l
In this section, we solve for the optimal decisions of households, ﬁrms and
political parties. The (Markov-perfect) general equilibrium solution will con-
sist of a system of dynamic relations, which jointly specify the paths of pri-
7The transmission mechanism is similar to that in e.g. Alesina and Tabellini (1990),
Lockwood et al. (1996), Devereux and Wen (1998), Persson and Tabellini (1999) and
Economides et al. (2003).
4vate consumption and investment; public consumption and investment; the
income tax rate and the share of tax revenues allocated to government in-
vestment relative to government consumption. The solution will be in terms
of the predetermined capital stock and the expected values of the exoge-
nous stochastic variables which include innovations to technology and the
re-election probability.
The setup will be a two-party variant of Barro’s (op cit.)m o d e lo fl o n g -
term growth and optimally chosen ﬁscal policy. In addition to having two
political parties that alternate in power, the other diﬀerence from Barro’s
model is that we allow the incumbent party to choose not only the income
tax rate but also the allocation of tax revenues between public investment and
consumption8. In this framework, elections take place in each period. The
timing within a period is as follows: First, electoral uncertainty is resolved.
Second, the elected party chooses current policy. Third, private agents act.
We deliberately employ a simple model. This applies especially to the
private economy, since the presence of endogenous re-election probabilities
will unavoidably complicate the policy process.
2.1 Household’s problem









where E is an expectations operator, and Ct, Lt,a n dGc
t are respectively
private consumption, labor supply and government consumption at time t,
0 <β<1 i st h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n duCt, uGc
t > 0 and uLt < 0.T h e
speciﬁcf o r mf o ru is given by
u(Ct,L t,G
c
t)=l nCt + ζ ln(1 − Lt)+δlnG
c
t (2)
where, ζ,δ > 0 are the relative weights given to leisure, (1 − Lt) and
public consumption respectively.
At time t, the household rents its predetermined capital, Kt,t ot h eﬁrm
and receives rtKt,w h e r ert is the market return to capital. It also supplies
8See Devereux and Wen (1998) and Economides et al. (2003) for Barro-type models
incorporating electoral uncertainty. In these models however, the incumbent party only
chooses the tax rate. See also Park and Philippopoulos (2003, 2004) for models in which
the government chooses the allocation of tax revenues among public investment, public
consumption and redistributive transfers.
5labor services, Lt,a taw a g er a t e ,wt. Further, it receives dividends or proﬁts
made by ﬁrms, πt. Thus, the household’s budget constraint is given by
Kt+1 + Ct =( 1− τt)(rtKt + wLt + πt) (3)
where Kt+1 denotes the capital stock chosen at t and 0 <τ t < 1 is the
income tax rate at t. For simplicity, we assume full capital depreciation
(implying that the end-of-period capital stock is equal to investment). The
initial stock, K0,i sg i v e n .
2.2 Firm’s problem
The representative ﬁrm maximizes the usual proﬁt, πt,f u n c t i o n
πt = Yt − rtKt − wtLt. (4)
As in the literature introduced by Barro (op cit.), public services provide
production externalities to private ﬁrms and technology at the ﬁrm’s level








where is Yt output, At is productivity, Gi
t is public production services
and 0 <α<1 is the productivity of private capital. Following the RBC








where A0 > 0 is a constant, 0 <ρ a < 1 is the autoregressive parameter
and the innovations, ηt˜iid(0,σ2
η).
2.3 Government budget constraint






t = τt(rtKt + wtLt + πt). (7)
Without loss of generality, we suppose that a share of total tax revenues,
0 <θ t < 1, ﬁnances Gi
t and the rest, 0 < 1 − θt < 1, ﬁnances Gc
t.T h u s ,( 7 )
can be decomposed into:
G
i
t = θtτt(rtKt + wtLt + πt) (8)
G
c
t =( 1− θt)τt(rtKt + wtLt + πt) (9)
where inspection of (7)-(9) reveals that τt and θt fully summarize ﬁscal
policy at time t.
62.4 Competitive decentralized equilibrium
Given the paths of the economic policy instruments {τt,θ t}
∞
t=0, a competitive
decentralized equilibrium (CDE)i sd e ﬁned to be a sequence of allocations




t=0 and prices {rt,w t}
∞
t=0 such that: (i) households max-
imize (1) subject to (3) and ﬁrms maximize (4) subject to (5) by taking prices,
tax policy and public services as given; (ii) all budget constraints are satis-
ﬁed; (iii) all markets clear. Then, as Appendix A shows, we get (see also e.g.
Sargent (1987) and McCallum (1989)):
Result 1: In a competitive decentralized equilibrium (for any feasible
economic policy), optimal private consumption and capital accumulation are:
Ct =( 1− αβ)A
1/α




t (1 − τt)(τtθtLt)
(1−α)/αKt (11)
where Lt ≡ L = 1−α
1−α+ζ(1−αβ).













Note that our model speciﬁcation9 permits an exact closed-form solution.
Also, Ct and Kt+1 depend on the beginning-of-period capital stock and the
current values of the policy instruments only, which will make the policymak-
ers’ optimization problem recursive (see below). However, before we move
on to the policymakers’ problem, further note two economic implications of
the CDE. First, (11) gives the usual Laﬀer curve eﬀect from the tax rate
t ot h er a t eo fe c o n o m i cg r o w t h .T h u s ,i f(1 − α − τt) > 0, the growth rate
increases with τt and if (1 − α − τt) < 0, the growth rate decreases with
τt (see, Barro, (op cit.)). Second, (11) also implies that the growth rate
increases monotonically with θt. Thus, a higher share of tax revenues allo-
cated to public investment relative to public consumption always stimulates
growth.
Therefore the CDE solution, for any feasible policy, consists of equations
(10)-(13) and (6) for Ct, Kt+1, Gi
t, Gc
t and At respectively. It is convenient
for what follows to re-express the four components of output in stationary
form by dividing (10)-(13) by the predetermined capital stock, Kt
10.I ne ﬀect
9That is, Cobb-Douglas functions for utility and production as well as full capital
depreciation.
10Note that Kt ≡ It−1, which follows from our assumption of full capital depreciation.
7this removes a common stochastic trend from each of the control variables.
Thus,
ct =( 1− αβ)A
1/α























2.5 The electoral system, political parties and deﬁni-
tion of general equilibrium
To endogenize economic policy, as summarized by τt and θt at each t,w ec o n -
sider a non-cooperative (Nash) game between two political parties, denoted
by h and j. The parties can alternate in power according to a stochastic re-
election probability. Speciﬁcally, if elections take place in each time-period11,
we assume that the party in power at t has a probability of 0 ≤ qt+1 ≤ 1
of winning the next election and remaining in power at t +1 . Accordingly,
0 ≤ (1 − qt+1) ≤ 1 is the incumbent’s probability of losing the next election
and being out of power at t +1 .












where 0 <q 0 < 1 is a constant, 0 <ρ q < 1 is the autoregressive para-
meter, it ≡
Kt+1
Kt is current capital accumulation (see equation (110)a b o v e ) ,
i is the model-consistent long-run value of it (for any variable xt, x denotes
its long-run value)12, γ ≥ 0 is a feedback parameter that measures the eﬀect
of the state of the economy on the re-election probability, and εt˜iid(0,σ 2
ε)
11See e.g. Lockwood et al. (1996) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for models where
elections take place every other period. This produces electoral cycles in the sense that pre-
election periods can diﬀer from post-election periods. In our model electoral uncertainty
aﬀects the economy in the same way every period. Note that our main results do not
depend on this assumption. Also note that we solve a general equilibrium dynamic multi-
period model, whereas Lockwood et al. have solved for the public ﬁnance sector only, and
Persson and Tabellini have just studied two-period models.
12See Subsection 2.7 for discussion of how we derive the long-run solution.
8are the innovations to qt. Note, the endogenous rule for qt has the desirable
steady-state property that qt = q0
13.
With γ>0, the incumbent’s re-election probability increases with cur-
rent capital accumulation. Obviously, there are other possible state variables
that can aﬀect the re-election probability. For instance, another obvious can-
didate in our model could be to employ the output gap,
yt(≡Yt/Kt)
y . However,
this argument has less intuitive properties than capital accumulation. For ex-
ample, using capital accumulation in (14) implies: (i) a positive relationship
between the re-election probability and the current share of tax revenues used




αθt > 0; and (ii) a negative





ατt(1−τt) < 0 (when the income tax rate is higher than the
productivity of public production services)14. In contrast, if we employ the
output gap in (14), then the probability of being re-elected increases when




ατt > 0. Since this property is at
odds with both politicians’ observed behaviour or promises prior to an elec-
tion as well as with voters’ preferences, we prefer to endogenize q by using
capital accumulation as the state variable.
Given the above, the political general equilibrium is deﬁned as follows.
First, when in power at t, the elected party chooses policy during its term in
oﬃce, τt and θt, subject to the CDE summarized by (10)-(13). In doing so, it
takes the future policy of the other party, which can be in power at t+1with
an o n z e r op r o b a b i l i t y(1 − qt+1), as given. Second, we solve for Markov policy
strategies, which means that τt and θt can be functions of the current value
of the state variables only. Moreover, we will focus on symmetric Markov
strategies so that the parties’ policies will be alike ex post15.
2.6 Fiscal policies and political general equilibrium
From the political parties’ viewpoint, the state variables at t are the econ-
omy’s inherited capital stock, Kt, and the current value of the stochastic
13We include a constant, q0, since otherwise the mean of qt would be zero, which is
counter intuitive in the case of re-election probabilities. Also note that the autoregressive
component of (14) is consistent with previous empirical studies. For instance, Dixit et al.
(2000) use an exogenous political process similar to that in (14), and provide empirical
support. In addition, when Price and Sanders (1994) examine the determinants of govern-
ment popularity in post-war Britain, they ﬁnd evidence of substantial history-dependence
in popularity.
14We show below that, along the optimal path, this is indeed the case.
15Thus, the model highlights electoral and not partisan eﬀects on growth. This appears
reasonable in light of the ﬁndings of Alesina et al. (op cit. )w h od on o tﬁnd any systematic
partisan eﬀects on growth.
9processes for qt and At. Therefore, let V Ph (Kt;qt,A t) and V Nh (Kt;qt,A t)
denote the value functions of party h at time t when in power and when out
of power respectively. Party j’s problem is symmetric. These two value func-
tions must satisfy the following pair of Bellman equations for each party16:
V









Nh (Kt+1;qt+1,A t+1)]} (15)
V
Nh (Kt;qt,A t)=l n Ct + δlnG
c
t + βEt[(1 − qt+1)V
Ph (Kt+1;qt+1,A t+1)
+qt+1V
Nh (Kt+1;qt+1,A t+1)] (16)
where Ct, Kt+1, Gc
t and qt+1 are given by (10), (11), (13) and (14) respec-
tively and the parameter R ≥ 0 is an exogenous extra rent when in power.
Party j 6= h solves an analogous problem, so that we have two pairs of value
functions like (15) and (16).
Note the following considerations regarding the set-up of the Bellman
equations. First, since Lt ≡ L in a CDE,w ed on o ti n c l u d eζ ln(1 − Lt)
in the party’s objective functions. Second, in (15), the incumbent has a
probability qt+1 of remaining in power, and a probability (1−qt+1) of losing
the coming election. By contrast, in (16), when the party is out of power it
knows that there is a probability qt+1 of continuing to be out of power and
a probability (1 − qt+1) of returning to power in the next election. Third,
the exogenous ego rents when in power, R ≥ 0,” r e ﬂe c tt h ev a l u ea t t a c h e d
to winning the election and holding oﬃce” (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000,
pp. 49-50). In contrast, when out of power, the party’s instantaneous payoﬀ
is only the representative citizen’s, i.e. lnCt + δlnG17.F o u r t h ,i n( 1 5 ) ,t h e
policy instruments are chosen by the incumbent party h. By contrast, in (16),
the policy instruments are those of party j since party h is out of power. For






tLt)(1−α)/αKt since party h has
been in power at t, while in (16) Kt+1 = αβA
1/α







since it is party j t h a th a sb e e ni np o w e ra tt. In other words, when party





t in (16) as given. This justiﬁes the Nash setup between parties h and
j. Moreover, policies will be symmetric ex post. Fifth, the structure of
the political optimization problem is recursive. In other words, given the
16See e.g. Alesina and Tabillini (op cit.) for similar modeling.
17This is a popular and convenient way to diﬀerentiate ”in” from ”out” of power payoﬀs
(see various models in the book by Persson and Tabellini, op cit.). See also Lockwood et
al.( op cit.) who provide references from the political science literature that support our
approach.
10other party’s policy choices, current policy choices aﬀect returns dated at
t,t +1 ,...∞ (see e.g. Sargent (1987)). Hence, optimal polices will be time-
consistent.
Since exact analytical solutions cannot be obtained from the optimiza-
tion problem given by (15)-(16), we use ﬁrst-order log-linear approximations
around the long-run equilibrium18. This will enable us to obtain an approxi-
mate closed-form analytical solution for the policy instruments τt and θt.W e




1 lnKt + u
Ph
2 lnqt + u
Ph
3 lnAt and




1 lnKt + u
Nh
2 lnqt + u
Nh
3 lnAt can approximately
solve the problem of party h in (15)-(16), where the u’s are undertermined
coeﬃcients as deﬁned in Appendix B. There are analogous conjectures for
party j 6= h. Appendix B shows that if we use these conjectures into (15)-




t,i m p o s et h eex post symmetry conditions τh
t = τ
j





uPh = uPj ≡ uP and uNh = uNj ≡ uN,a n dt a k eaﬁrst-order linear approx-
imation around the model-consistent long-run equilibrium presented below,
we obtain:
Result 2: In a Markov-perfect general equilibrium of a symmetric Nash
game between the political parties, the income tax rate, τt,a n dt h es h a r eo f
total tax revenues used to ﬁnance government investment, θt, are approxi-
mately given by:
















where for any variable xt, xt ≡ xt−x
x
∼ = ln(xt/x); x is the model-consistent
long-run value of xt;
Ω1 ≡
δ[τ(τ+α−1)+(1−α)(1−τ)]







































































18Campbell and Viceira (2002, ch. 5) use a similar type of approximation to solve the
Bellman equation in dynamic asset pricing models. This is the same type of approximation
used in e.g. Campbell (1993), but instead of using it to linearize the budget constraint,
here we use it to solve the Bellman equation. Details are in Appendix B.
11Therefore, (17)-(18), jointly with the CDE in (100)-(130), give a stationary
political general equilibrium in which economic policy is optimally chosen by
two political parties that alternate in power according to the re-election prob-
ability in (14). The solution is summarized in the next subsection, and its
quantitative economic implications will be studied post econometric estima-
tion using impulse response functions and forecast error decompositions. At
this stage, we just note that although we allowed the policy instruments to
depend also on the predetermined capital stock, Kt, in (15)-(16), the policy
instruments are eventually independent of b Kt,i n( 1 7 ) - ( 1 8 ) . T h i si sat y p e
of tax smoothing result, as in the model introduced by Barro (1999), in the
sense that policymakers ﬁnd it eﬃcient not to respond to the capital stock
when they set policy.
2.7 The steady-state and the linearized political gen-
eral equilibrium
In the absence of technology and electoral shocks, i.e. ηt = εt =0for all
t, the economy converges to its steady-state in which all of the stationary
variables are constant (for any xt, x denotes its long-run value).
Expressions for the model consistent long-run values of A, c, i, gi, gc
and q being comprised of non-linear convolutions of the underlying structural
parameters are obtained by suppressing the time subscripts in (6), (100)-(130)
and (14) respectively, and performing the appropriate recursive substitutions.
Note that A = A0,a n dq = q0.
Appendix C shows that the long-run values of the policy instruments
are τ =
1+δ−α(1+βδ)
1+δ and θ =
(1−α)(1+δ)
1+δ−α(1+βδ). It is straightforward to show
that this long-run solution coincides with the solution of a benevolent single
government. The latter of course would not only hold in the long-run but
for all t. Thus, in the long-run equilibrium, electoral uncertainty should not
aﬀect the conduct of policy. Also note that when agents do not value public
consumption services (i.e. δ =0 ), we obtain τ =1− α and θ =1which is
Barro’s (1990) popular result for the optimal ﬂat tax rate in a model with a
single benevolent government.
We can now present the ﬁrst-order Taylor series approximation of the










































(1 − α − θ)
α(1 − θ)
b θt (1300)
















b At = ρa b At−1 + ηt (600)













where equations (170) and (180) are simply equations (17) and (18) rewrit-
ten, equations (1000)−(1300), (600), (1400) are the linearized versions of (100)−
(130), (6) and (14) respectively, and Ω5 and Ω6 are deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 . 6 .
This is the model we will estimate below.
3 Econometric model
In this section, we econometrically estimate our DSGE model using U.S.
quarterly data from 1947:1 to 2004:2. To this end, we employ Ireland’s (op
cit.) methodology which uses the Kalman Filter to obtain the maximum
likelihood estimates of: (i) the underlying ”deep” or structural parameters;
(ii) the coeﬃcients and variances of the processes driving electoral uncer-
tainty and technology; (iii) and the parameters, variances and covariances
from a vector AR(1) model of the ”measurement errors”. In addition to
providing estimates of the model’s structural parameters, this section will
present forecast accuracy comparisons with an unrestricted vector autore-
gressive model, parameter stability tests, impulse responses to political and
productivity shocks and ﬁnally forecast error decompositions.
3.1 Measurement Issues and the Data
To numerically examine the quantitative implications of our DSGE model,
we nominally require data for the four subcomponents of output: (ct,i t,gi
t,g c
t),
the two policy instruments: (τt,θ t), and the two stochastic exogenous processes:
(At,q t). However, in practice, measured analogues of these data are either
subject to observation error or are unobservable. For example, since the re-
ported data on electoral uncertainty embody multiple dimensions of political
uncertainty and instability, which make it diﬀerent from the measure implied
13by our model (i.e. the “probability of staying in oﬃce”), we need to formally
account for this additional error. Measurement errors are also particularly
relevant when it comes to the distinction between government consumption
and production services. Typically, national income accounting practice fails
to recognize the investment characteristics of many categories of government
expenditure. Examples include expenditure on education, or expenditure on
social security programs19. Given the serious diﬃculties with obtaining an
even loose correspondence between τt and θt and the available data, we treat
these data as unobservables in the econometric analysis. The same reasoning
applies to At since, although estimates are available via growth accounting
exercises, they would have to be generated using an alternative model to
the one derived here. With these considerations in mind, we treat all of the
control variables (ct,i t,g i
t,g c
t) plus our measure of political uncertainty qt
as being observable but with error, while our policy variables (τt, θt) plus At
are treated as unobservable.
In the econometric estimation reported below, we employ U.S. data for
real personal consumption expenditure, real gross private domestic invest-
ment and real government consumption expenditures & gross investment
taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED database20. These
three series are re-expressed in per capita terms by dividing by the mid-period
population ﬁgures made available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis21.
Finally our measure of electoral uncertainty is the presidential job approval
rating collected by the Gallup Organization. These data are reported on
a bi-weekly frequency in units of % approval out of 100 which we convert
to a quarterly frequency for the entire observation period22.B o t h t h e a p -
proval rate and the log deviation from its sample mean are summarized in
Table 1. The measures of central tendency for the approval rating which are
roughly 50% reﬂect, as expected, that a signiﬁcant incumbency advantage or
disadvantage does not exist over this long time span of data.
19This is widely recognized in the literature (see e.g. Devarajan et al. (1996) and Kneller
et al., (1999)).
20The source data agency is the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of
Economic Analysis. All three series are seasonally adjusted at annual rate and
are in billions of chained 2000 dollars. The FRED database can be found at:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
21More speciﬁcally, these data are taken from line 38 of Table 2.1. Personal Income
and Its Disposition and are reported in units of 1000. These data can be found at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/.
22This information is compiled and made available by the Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research, see http://roperweb.ropercenter.uconn.edu.
14Table 1: Presidential Approval Rating





Std. dev. 12.43 0.249
Obs. 230 230
3.2 State-Space Representation
As discussed above, our state (At,q t), control (ct,i t,g i
t,g c
t) and policy
(τt, θt) variables are either measured with error or are unobservable. Ac-
cordingly, we will estimate our model’s state-space representation using the
Kalman Filter which is ideally suited for this purpose. For what follows it is
useful to rewrite the log-linear model deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n2 . 7i nm a t r i xf o r m ,
e.g.
Bαt = Cαt−1 + Dυt (19)
B =
⎛
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝
1000−e a −e b −e c 0
0100−e a −e b −e c 0
0010−e c −e c −e c 0
0001−e c −e d −e c 0
0000 1 0 −e e −e f
0000 0 1 −e g −e h
0000 0 0 1 0
0000 0 0 0 1
⎞






































; e a =
(1 − α − τ)
α(1 − τ)







; e d =
(1 − α − θ)
α(1 − θ)
; e e = Ω5
γ
α




e h = Ω6ρq; e i = γe a; e j = γe b;a n de k = γe c.
where Ω5 and Ω6 are deﬁned in Section 2.6. Note that the presence of
Ω5 and Ω6 requires that we respect all of the non-linear cross- and within-
equations restrictions listed under equations (17)-(18).
15If we next formalize the distinction between variables observed with er-
ror23 and unobservables set out above, we can rewrite the above log-deviations
model in state-space form:
αt = Tαt−1 + Rυt (20)
yt = Zαt + νt (21)
νt = Vνt−1 + ςt (22)
where αt is the state or transition equation containing the unobservables;
T = B
−1C; R = B
−1D; yt is the measurement equation comprised of the
observable variables; the system matrix Z links the unobservables to the
observables; νt is a vector of measurement errors which follow a vector AR(1)
process and ςt˜N(0,Qς) are the the white noise errors, (see, Ireland (op
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Finally the measurement and transition equations respectively can be












































At time t =1 ,...,T,t h eK a l m a nﬁlter provides the optimal estimate for






23For each observed or measured variable X∗
t in our model, X∗
t = Xt + νt where Xt is
the true unobserved variable and νt is the measurement error.
16where ψ is a vector of hyperparameters and p(yt|Yt−1) is the distribution
of yt, conditional on the information set, Y,a tt i m et − 1.T h e v e c t o r ψ
includes: (i) the structural parameters, {α, β, γ, δ, ζ, R}; (ii) the long-run
values of productivity and the election probability, {A, q}; (iii) the ﬁrst-
order autoregressive parameters and the error variances for At and qt, {ρa,
ρq}, {σ2
a, σ2
q}; (iv) the parameters for the VA R (1) process describing the
measurement errors, {ν11, ν12, ν21, ν22}; and (v) the error variances and
covariance for the b y∗
t and b q∗
t measurement equations, {σ2
e y∗, σ2
e q∗, σ2
e y∗e q∗}. Given
the information set Yt−1, the true state vector is normally distributed with
mean at and covariance matrix Pt. Hence, yt is also normally distributed
with mean yt|t−1 = e Ztat|t−1 and error covariance matrix Ft. Accordingly the

















which has to be maximized with respect to the vector ψ and n is the number
of measurement equations.
3.3 Results
In this section we ﬁrst report the full sample estimates of our 19 hyperpara-
meters and their standard errors. Second, we conduct S−tests (see Diebold
and Mariano (1995) and Harvey et al. (1997)) to evaluate the null hypothesis
that there is no diﬀerence between the k-step ahead forecast accuracy of our
DSGE model and a benchmark unrestricted vector autoregression (UVAR).
We also undertake stability testing of our parameter estimates over several
sub-samples to test for parameter constancy. Third, after we have estab-
lished these model properties, we conduct an innovation accounting exercise
to establish the relative quantitative implications of electoral uncertainty and
technological change on the macro-economy.
3.3.1 Parameter Estimates
The full sample parameter estimates and standard errors reported in Table 2
below were obtained in a manner consistent with our priors which were nat-
urally very diﬀuse with respect to the variances and covariances24. However,
24Except of course that the variances must be positive. To ensure that the covariance
matrix is positive semideﬁnite, we feed the elements of a Cholesky decomposition as hy-
perparameters, and transform it back when building the system matrices of the state space
system (see e.g. Harvey, 1989, p.109)
17based on constraints dictated by the theory in Section 2, we do have strong
priors regarding the structural parameters. For the discussion which follows
we will denote the vector of 8 structural parameters as πs and elements of
this vector as πs
i. Recall that these 8 parameters include the productivity
of private capital, α,w h e r e(1 − α) is the productivity of public capital; the
subjective rate of time preference, β; the weights consumers place on govern-
ment consumption and leisure relative to private consumption in their utility
function, i.e. δ and ζ respectively; the state dependent feedback parameter
determining the re-election probability, γ; the long-run value of productiv-
ity, A; the long-run re-election probability, q;a n dt h ee x t r ar e n t sa c c r u i n g
to party’s in power, R. To encompass the range of values found in other
empirical and calibration studies, we impose the following restrictions in our
estimation: 0.3 <α<0.75; 0.95 <β<0.99; 0 <γ<0.5; 0 <δ<1;
1 <ζ<4; R>0; 0 <A<6;a n d0 <q<1(see, e.g. Baier and Glomm
(2001), Lansing (1998), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), Chari et al.
(1994, 1995), McGrattan (1994), Aschauer (1989), Barro (1989)).
To formally incorporate this non-sample information, we apply several
transformations to each of the structural parameters prior maximizing the
likelihood function. Following Ireland (op cit.), the ﬁrst of these has the eﬀect
of restricting each transformed parameter to lie between zero and unity; e.g.
π
t1









2. Given the high degree of non-linearity in the
l i k e l i h o o df u n c t i o na n di nt h ec o n v o l u t ions of structural parameters, which
must also satisfy both within- and cross-equation restrictions, to improve the
numerical properties of our estimation, we further transform π
t1
i using the
ranges listed above. This helps us to avoid conditioning on ﬁxed parameter
values which are unreasonable in wider intervals. The additional transfor-
mation is placed on π
t1
i ,e . g . π
t2








.N o t e
that despite these transformations, the numerical optimization procedure is
free to search for any value of π
si
i between −∞ to +∞.O n c et h em a x i m u m
of the log likelihood function is obtained, we undo these transformations to
s o l v ef o rt h ee l e m e n t so fπs which then lie between the ranges speciﬁed. It
is important to note here that none of our constraints bind, i.e. in Table 2
neither our estimates nor the end points of their conﬁdence intervals lie on
any constraint boundaries. To obtain the standard errors, we undertake a
parametric bootstrap (see, e.g. Efron and Tibshirani 1993) with 1000 repli-
cations. Finally note that our estimates imply a stable restricted VA R (1)
since the absolute maximum eigenvalue of the system matrix T is 0.98.


















σˆ y  0.044 0.012
σˆ q  0.014 0.004
σˆ y ˆ q  0.001 0.000
The results reported in Table 2 above show that all of the structural
parameters are signiﬁcant and of reasonable magnitude. The estimated value
of α implies a productivity of public capital, (1 − α), of around 0.31, which
is similar to that in Aschauser (1989). The value of γ, the feedback policy
coeﬃcient in (14) measuring the eﬀect of the endogenous state of the economy
on the re-election probability, is positive as it should be and relatively high
indicating that voters do look at the economy when they form their party
preferences. The value of the weight given to public consumption relative to
private consumption in the citizen’s utility function, δ, is similar to that found
in Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) who report values between 0.2 to
0.4. The value of the weight given to leisure relative to private consumption
in utility, ζ, is almost four times the weight given to private consumption,
which is similar to several RBC calibrated values (see e.g. Chari et al.,
1994, 1995). The value of the extra rent when in power, R,i sa l s of o u n dt o
be signiﬁcant and positive conﬁrming the assumption usually made in the
PBC literature. The estimated long-run probability of an incumbent being
reelected, q, is 0.5 suggesting the absence of incumbency advantage in the
19steady-state. The persistence of technology and popularity shocks is high25,
where the former is very close to those found in most RBC models (see e.g.
Cooley and Hansen, 1995).
3.3.2 Model Diagnostics
S-Tests Root mean square errors and bias-corrected S tests of relative
forecasting accuracy for 1-4 quarters ahead are reported in Table 3 below26.
To calculate these tests we estimate the model from 1947:1 to 1980:4 and use
the remaining part of the full sample i.e. 1981:1 to 2004:2 to conduct the out-
of-sample forecasts27. Strictly speaking, the forecasts of our DSGE model
and those of the UVAR are not comparable since our state-space model
provides a forecast which includes an estimate of the measurement error.
Accordingly, our forecasts will be of the ”true” values of ˆ y and ˆ q whereas
the UVAR forecasts are based on the measured data only. Nonetheless this
is a rough and ready method to assess the ﬁt of our model relative to a
non-structural benchmark model (see also Ireland (op cit.))
Table 3: Bias corrected S-tests
Qtrs. RMSE (Model) RMSE (UVAR) corrected S-test p-value
Ahead b y b q b y b q b y b q b y b q
1 0.0583 0.1718 0.0655 0.1580 0.8679 -1.6930 0.1927 0.0452
2 0.0699 0.2052 0.0698 0.1870 -0.0434 -1.6058 0.4827 0.0542
3 0.0839 0.2277 0.0798 0.2037 -0.6871 -1.4035 0.2460 0.0802
4 0.0942 0.2471 0.0882 0.2140 -0.6269 -1.5814 0.2654 0.0569
Overall, the results in Table 3 indicate (at the 5% level) that there is eﬀec-
tively no diﬀerence in the forecasting performance between the two models.
The one exception here is that the UVAR outperforms our DSGE model in
the one quarter ahead frequency for ˆ q. This is not surprising given that our
process for ˆ q only depends on ˆ y indirectly in contrast to the direct link in
the UVAR. It is also encouraging that despite the restrictions placed by the
theory on the reduced form solution for ˆ y, our model is not outperformed by
the UVAR.T h i sﬁnding for ˆ y echoes the results in Ireland (op cit.).
Parameter stability Table 4 contains the results of parameter stability
tests. These are obtained by re-estimating our model over two sub-periods
25For example the half life, t∗ =l n ( 0 .5)/ln(ρi) of the shocks is 6.01 and 4.70 quarters
respectively for the technology and electoral shocks.
26Note that the benchmark UVAR(1) is based on b yt and b qt, where both are detrended
in the same manner as our DSGE model.
27The choice of these sub-samples is motivated below.
20and comparing the 90% conﬁdence intervals for these estimates with each
other and with those from the full sample. Our ﬁrst estimation period runs
from 1947:1 to 1980:4 and the second from 1981:1 to 2004:2. These sub-
periods are motivated in Ireland (op cit.) who argues, ”The 1980 breakpoint
corresponds, of course, to a date around which major changes in US monetary
and ﬁscal policies are widely thought to have occurred”.
The results in Table 4 show that all of our structural parameter estimates
(which include the error variance for q and A) contain conﬁdence intervals
which overlap. In other words, these estimates appear quite stable across
the various samples employed. Turning to the parameters in the VA R (1)
for the measurement errors (which includes the VA R error variances and
covariance), we can see again that all conﬁdence intervals overlap. However,
note that for the three ”starred” results the conﬁdence intervals cover zero.
In other words, the parameter ν21 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for
the two sub-samples and the covariance between the measurement errors,
σˆ y ˆ q ,i sa l s on o ts i g n i ﬁcant for the second sub-period.
Table 4: Parameter stability tests
(90% conﬁdence intervals)
Full Sample Pre 1980 Post 1980
α [0.640;0.750] [0.668;0.701] [0.687;0.721]
β [0.954;0.990] [0.956;0.962] [0.957;0.973]
γ [0.049;0.499] [0.272;0.323] [0.293;0.498]
δ [0.340;0.500] [0.341;0.429] [0.327;0.405]
ζ [3.769;4.000] [3.721;3.853] [3.581;3.841]
R [0.161;0.500] [0.136;0.370] [0.256;0.385]
A [5.959;5.987] [5.977;5.988] [5.979;5.980]
q [0.501;0.915] [0.501;0.720] [0.500;0.813]
ρa [0.032;0.990] [0.084;0.898] [0.170;0.888]
ρq [0.630;0.889] [0.671;0.889] [0.660;0.879]
ν11 [0.373;1.540] [0.376;1.004] [0.394;1.186]
ν12 [0.366;1.111] [0.355;0.818] [0.251;0.762]
ν21 [0.003;0.009] *[-0.106;0.152] *[-0.001;0.118]
ν22 [0.254;1.549] [0.675;0.927] [0.726;0.981]
σa [0.001;0.003] [0.001;0.004] [0.001;0.166]
σq [0.395;0.446] [0.376;0.911] [0.240;0.653]
σˆ y  [0.012;0.045] [0.014;0.070] [0.011;0.167]
σˆ q  [0.009;0.020] [0.051;0.072] [0.001;0.219]
σˆ y ˆ q  [0.000;0.001] [0.000;0.004] *[-0.012;0.010]
213.3.3 Innovation accounting
Impulse responses To quantify the impacts that changes in electoral un-
certainty have on the ﬁscal policy instruments and the macro-economy, as
well as the impacts of changes in technology, we next present impulse re-
sponses to a temporary one-standard deviation shock to the innovations in
electoral uncertainty and technology. Figure 1 reports the response of all
endogenous variables to these transitory shocks (all in terms of deviations
from their long-run value). For ease of comparison across the two sources of
the shocks, the left- and right-hand side axes for each endogenous variable
show the response to b A and b q shocks respectively. For example, the graph in
the ﬁrst row and ﬁrst column of the Figure shows the eﬀect on b A of an own
shock (solid line) and the eﬀect on b A of a shock to b q (dotted line). The latter
is obviously zero since, as in common in the RBC literature, b A is generated
by a simple AR(1) process (see equation 600) and is thus not state dependent.
Row 2 of Figure 1 shows that the unit standard deviation shocks produce
changes in private consumption and investment of similar magnitudes, with
the slightly stronger eﬀect resulting from the b A-shock. Also note that most
of the eﬀects resulting from these shocks have dissipated after 5 years. The
beneﬁcial eﬀects of the b A-shock on private consumption and investment are
as expected from standard RBC theory. In contrast, the private spending
enhancing eﬀects of the b q-shock can be explained by referring to how policy
endogenously responds to the shock. For example, the third row of the
Figure (dotted lines) shows that in increase in the re-election probability
leads to lower tax rates, b τt, and a higher share of tax revenues allocated
to public investment relative to public consumption, b θt. In other words, a
higher probability of re-election favors long-sighted policies. After the initial
impact, the paths of both instruments exponentially return to their steady-
states after about 5 years.
Given the state dependence of b q, the solid lines in row 3 of Figure 1 show
that the positive shock to b A is also conducive to policies which encourage
capital accumulation. However, due to the endogeneity and persistence of
b q, it takes relatively longer (e.g. half-life is approximately 9 years) for the
policy instruments to return to their steady-states28.
Row 4 of Figure 1 shows the eﬀects on government investment and con-
sumption deviations resulting from the two shocks. For example, in response
to the b A-shock both government consumption and investment increase by
t h es a m ei n i t i a lm a g n i t u d ea n db o t hr e t u r nt ot h es t e a d y - s t a t ea f t e ra b o u t5
years (with government consumption returning slightly faster). In contrast,
28In contrast if q were not state dependent, i.e. γ =0 , b τt and b θt would be zero for all t
(see, e.g. equations (170)a n d( 180)).
22Figure 1: Impulse responses to b A and b q shocks
23given the units on the right-hand scale of the gi graph, we can see that
government investment eﬀectively does not change in response to the b q-shock
whereas government consumption initially falls before exponentially return-
ing to the steady-state after approximately 20 quarters. Despite no change in
government investment, the following compositional changes in government
spending are implied by this shock: Gc
G and Gi




Y all decrease. In other words, after the positive shock
to b q, income taxes are lower and government spending is allocated more pro-
ductively. Finally note that shocks to b q have no eﬀect on b y for all t since the
positive eﬀects on b c and b i are fully crowded out by the fall in b gc.
What about the implications for economic growth? From the deﬁni-
tions of output and investment deviations, it follows that equilibrium output
growth is lni (i.e. 1.71%) and the transitional dynamics of output growth
are dictated by lnYt − lnYt−1 =b it−1 +l ni. Using this information, in Table
5 we construct the response of economic growth resulting from the b A and
b q-shocks.
Table 5: Output Growth Impact
ˆ A ˆ q
lag estimate se estimate se
0 1.983 0.3796 1.813 0.3734
5 1.864 0.3845 1.768 0.3661
10 1.797 0.3817 1.743 0.3640
25 1.725 0.3759 1.716 0.3631
50 1.711 0.3702 1.710 0.3630
long-run 1.710 0.3653 1.710 0.3630
In Table 5 technology and popularity shocks have similar growth eﬀects
and are both signiﬁcant, although the economic eﬀect of technology shocks
are larger and take slightly longer to dissipate. For example, the impact shock
to b A and b q add about 0.3 and 0.1 points to the output growth respectively.
Moreover the latter takes approximately 10 years to return to the steady-
state for the ˆ q shock and 10+ years for the b A shock.
Forecast error decompositions We ﬁr s te x a m i n et h er e l a t i v ec o n t r i b u -
tion of technology versus political shocks in explaining the k-step-ahead fore-
cast error variances in the components of output and the policy instruments
(see Tables 6 and 7). Since private and public spending plus the policy in-
struments are part of the transition equations system, we cannot examine the
relative contribution of the measurement errors. However, using the measure-
ment equation system in Table 8 we also inspect the relative contribution of
b A, b q plus the two measurement errors in explaining the k-step-ahead forecast
24error variances in political uncertainty29. Note that, to save space, standard
errors are not presented in Table 6-8. However further note that all of the
results are statistically signiﬁcant at least at the 5% level.
The results in Table 6 show that as expected, technology shocks have the
greatest explanatory power for the private spending components plus gov-
ernment investment. The latter follows since as shown above, while Gi/G
increases, government investment does not change in response to increases in
b q. Nonetheless changes in political uncertainty signiﬁcantly explain nearly
13% of the error variance in b c and b i and nearly all of the error variance in
government consumption. Likewise, as expected given our model speciﬁca-
tion, Table 7 shows that political uncertainty signiﬁcantly explains nearly all
of the error variance in the two policy instruments. As mentioned above, we
cannot assess the relative contribution of measurement errors at this stage
since we are using the transition equation system for Tables 6-7.
Table 6: Private & public spending
Qtrs. b c b i b gi b gc
Ahead b A b q b A b q b A b q b A b q
1 0.8745 0.1255 0.8745 0.1255 1.0000 0.0000 0.0034 0.9966
4 0.8746 0.1254 0.8746 0.1254 1.0000 0.0000 0.0031 0.9969
8 0.8746 0.1254 0.8746 0.1254 1.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.9972
12 0.8747 0.1253 0.8747 0.1253 1.0000 0.0000 0.0027 0.9973
20 0.8747 0.1253 0.8747 0.1253 1.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.9974
40 0.8747 0.1253 0.8747 0.1253 1.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.9975
∞ 0.8747 0.1253 0.8747 0.1253 1.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.9975
29We exclude the decomposition of the output error variance given the full crowding
out of b y by shocks to b q . This property implies that the contribution of shocks to b q in
explaining the forecast error variance in b y will be zero. Not surprisingly, given other ﬁnding
in the RBC literature, shocks to b A explain about 60% of the forecast error variance in b y
initially. However, in contrast to standard RBC models, this share eventually falls instead
of increases. This diﬀerence is most probably explained by our simple private sector setup
which was adopted here so that we could focus on a richer description of policy.
25Table 7: Policy instruments
Qtrs. b τ b θ
Ahead b A b q b A b q
1 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
4 0.0001 0.9999 0.0001 0.9999
8 0.0001 0.9999 0.0001 0.9999
12 0.0002 0.9998 0.0002 0.9998
20 0.0002 0.9998 0.0002 0.9998
40 0.0003 0.9997 0.0003 0.9997
∞ 0.0003 0.9997 0.0003 0.9997
Consistent with the focus of the paper, we can assess the relative con-
tribution of all four innovations (i.e. two structural and two measurement)
in explaining the observed variation in political uncertainty. Table 8 sug-
gests that in the short-run, innovations to b q plus the measurement errors in
political uncertainty, ν2t, explain most of the forecast error variance in b q.
However, in the long-run nearly 75% of the latter is explained by technol-
ogy innovations. This suggests that economic growth matters for political
stability.
Table 8: Electoral Uncertainty
Qtrs. b q
Ahead b A b qν 1t ν2t
1 0.0518 0.4732 0.0000 0.4750
4 0.3423 0.3241 0.0001 0.3335
8 0.5878 0.1979 0.0001 0.2141
12 0.6917 0.1437 0.0002 0.1644
20 0.7587 0.1064 0.0003 0.1346
40 0.7688 0.0928 0.0006 0.1378
∞ 0.7450 0.0895 0.0011 0.1644
4 Conclusions
This paper has solved a tractable benchmark DSGE model to study the
link between elections, ﬁscal policy and ﬂuctuations/growth. The model
was then formally estimated for the US by using Ireland’s (2004) ﬂexible
hybrid estimation methodology. The focus has been on the eﬀects of electoral
uncertainty upon the choice of ﬁs c a lp o l i c yi n s t r u m e n t sa n di nt u r nu p o nt h e
macro-economy.
The main theoretical result is that electoral uncertainty pushes govern-
ments to follow relatively short-sighted ﬁscal policies and this is detrimental
26for the macro-economy. There are two aspects to our transmission mechanism
worth pointing out. First, it is the assumption that the parties’ instantaneous
payoﬀ is higher when in power than when out of power, in combination with
electoral (probabilistic) uncertainty, that leads to short-sighted policies and
electoral business cycles in general. With rational forward-looking policy-
makers, if we relax any of these two assumptions, the problem collapses to
a single government case. Second, the assumption that the re-election prob-
ability is endogenous depending on the current performance of the economy
reduces but cannot eliminate these electoral eﬀects. Again, what is crucial is
that the incumbent knows that he/she may be replaced in the coming election
by another politician and that there is an extra rent when in power30.
Our econometric results have provided clear support for these propo-
sitions. By explicitly modeling the behavioral channel through which the
election process aﬀects the macroeconomy, we found statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects of electoral shocks on the policy instruments and the various com-
ponents of output. In particular, there is evidence that shocks to electoral
uncertainty lead to higher tax rates and less productive use of government
spending. Qualitatively, positive popularity and technology shocks have sim-
ilar beneﬁcial eﬀects on private spending (consumption and investment) and
economic growth. Quantitatively, the eﬀects on the policy instruments are
dominated by electoral shocks, while private spending and economic growth
(as expected) are aﬀected more by technology than by electoral shocks. Fi-
nally our forecast error decompositions revealed that while political shocks
dominate productivity shocks in the short-run, in the long-run, economic
growth is what matters most for political stability.
Our research contributes to both the literature on political business cy-
cles, as well as the quantitative RBC literature. It adds to the former mainly
because, to the extent that we formally estimated the solution of the the-
oretical model, we ﬁlled a gap between theoretical and empirical research.
To date, there has been very little econometric work, which has successfully
made the formal link between electoral uncertainty, endogenous ﬁscal policy
and ultimately aggregate outcomes. Our research also adds to the RBC lit-
erature because we departed from the world of a centralized economy and
a benevolent single government. This allowed us to incorporate some im-
portant policy choices. We also obtained estimated values of a number of
stable parameters which are of key interest in a variety of DSGE modeling
contexts.
30See e.g. Lockwood et al. (1996) and Economides et al. (2003) for more details on
these points.
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5.1 Appendix A: Result 1















and the budget constraint in (3).
















Moreover, we conjecture that Lt does not change over time and that Ct
and Kt+1 are proportional to the product
A
1/α
t (1 − τt)Kt(τtθtLt)
(1−α)/α
where the assumed degrees of proportionality are time-invariant (for further
details, see McCallum 1989, pp. 21-22). Then substituting these conjectures
into (A1) we obtain Kt+1.I nt u r nb yu s i n g( 3 )w eg e tCt and by using (A2)
we ﬁnd Lt. These three solutions are given in Result 1. The solutions for Gi
t
and Gc
t follow respectively from (8) and (9).
5.2 Appendix B: Result 2
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First consider the term {V P(t+1)−V N(t+1)} on the right-hand side of
(B1-B2). In a symmetric equilibrium, the policies chosen by party j when in
power (during which party h i so u to fp o w e r )a r et h es a m ea st h o s ec h o s e n
by party h when in power (during which party j is out of power). Hence,
for a given state of the economy, equations (10)-(13) imply that private and
public consumption will also be the same when in and when out of power.
Hence,
{V
P(t +1 )− V


















Consider next the partial derivatives on the right-hand side of (B.1)-(B.2).


































3 ≥ 0 are time-
invariant undetermined coeﬃcients, we have the following partial derivatives










































Using (B.3)-(B.4) into (B.1)-(B.2), we obtain:
δ(1 − τt)
(τt + α − 1)
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33Equations (B.5)-(B.6) are not reduced-form solutions for τt and θt because
they include the undermined coeﬃcients. Nevertheless, they can provide













≥ 0 (i.e. the parties cannot be worse
oﬀ when in power), they imply τt > (1 − α) and θt > (1 − α) along the
optimal path. Also, it is worth pointing out that if the re-election probability,
qt+1, were exogenous (namely, not a function of it/i or any other endogenous
variable), it would be possible to obtain analytic results at this stage showing
that when the re-election probability increases, rational policymakers ﬁnd it
optimal to choose a lower tax rate, τt, and a higher share allocated to public
investment vis-à-vis public consumption, θt
31. However, with endogenous
re-election probabilities, it is not possible to show this without resorting to
special cases. We therefore prefer not to present any policy properties at this
stage, but instead use impulse response functions to quantify the reactions
of the policy instruments, τt and θt, to random shocks to qt,a n di nt u r nt h e
control variables in (10)-(13).
Next, we take a linear approximation of (B.5)-(B.6) around the model
consistent long-run equilibrium. It is then straightforward to show that we
obtain equations (17)-(18) in the main body of the paper where Ω1 −Ω6 are













It remains to solve for the undetermined coeﬃcients. Actually, what we
are interested in is the value of M that aﬀe c t st h ec h o i c eo ft h ep o l i c yi n s t r u -
ments. We work as follows. We go back to (15)-(16), use the conjectures for
the value functions, and take a ﬁrst-order approximation around the long-
run. Then, we use (17)-(18) for b θt and b τt,a sw e l la s( 10), (11), (13), (14)
and (6)t oo b t a i nb Ct, b Kt+1, b Gc
t, b qt+1,a n d b At+1, respectively32.W ea l s om a k e
use of (B.3). Substituting all these equations back into (15)-(16), and equat-
ing coeﬃcients on b Kt on both sides of (15)-(16), we obtain a system of two
Riccati equations in uP
1 and uN




Working similarly, if we equate coeﬃcients on b qt on both sides of (15)-(16),
we obtain a system of two Riccati equations in uP
2 and uN






















as in the main text. Note that our nu-






, and hence M, which we expect
31T h e s er e s u l t sa r ea v a i l a b l eu p o nr e q u e s t .












b θt+ b Kt,
and b Gc
t = 1








α b At +
(1−α−τ)





+ εt+1 and b At+1 = ρaAt + ηt+1.
34both to be positive.
5.3 Appendix C: Policy instruments in the steady-state
In the long-run, b θt = b τt requires Ω5 = Ω6 =0i n( 1 7 ) - ( 1 8 ) ,w h i c hi nt u r nn e -
cessitates R = M =0 .T h u s ,i nt h el o n g - r u n ,t h e r ec a n n o tb ea n ye x t r ar e n t s
from being in power, R =0 , and hence the valuation coeﬃcients are the same













Using these conditions into the Riccati equations for uP
2 and uN
2 ,w e g e t
uP
2 = uN
2 =0 . Substituting all this into the ﬁrst-order conditions (B.5)-
(B.6), we obtain the long-run solutions for τ and θ reported in the body
of the paper (see Subsection 2.7). As stated earlier, this coincides with the
solution of a benevolent single government i.e. qt =1and R =0for all t in
(15)-(16).
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